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Abstract 
Lin Ostrom’s work constitutes a great step forward in the analysis of social 
governance. Instead of focusing on the technical characteristics of goods she studies 
what types of institutions have emerged and how they affect individual motivation and 
behavior in public goods and commons situations. Her approach represents a careful 
analysis of institutions often emerging from below. Unorthodox impacts of institutions 
on individual motivation and behavior as well as the possible creation of new 
institutions must be taken into account. The constitution must ensure that the involved 
individuals can establish adequate institutions regardless of possible opposition by 
politicians and bureaucrats.  
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Technical definitions versus institutional and behavioral analysis 
 
“Public goods” should be provided by the government, “private goods” by the market – this is 
still the dominant view in economics since Samuelson (1954). Elinor Ostrom has 
demonstrated in her work that this distinction between goods based on their technical 
characteristics (non-excludability and no rivalry in consumption) is inappropriate when real 
world issues are considered. There is indeed an enormous variety of ways public and private 
goods are supplied depending on the relevant institutional conditions. Lin departs from the 
simple public-private, or (0, 1), thinking. She shows that there are many alternatives to an 
exclusive government provision or an exclusive private provision. She thereby shifts the 
approach from the technical into the social scientific arena. Starting with her best-known book 
Governing the Commons (Ostrom 1990) she finds that under many conditions human 
ingenuity is capable of overcoming the free riding problems inherent in goods with open 
access, be they public goods or commons.  Human beings are not passive adaptors to 
particular technical characteristics; rather they create institutional conditions helping to 
overcome the incentives to free ride. She emphasizes that regular face-to-face interaction and 
discussions are crucial. In addition, individual actions must become known to the other 
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persons involved in order to prevent egoistic exploitation. Knowing that deviant behavior may 
be observed is in some case sufficient to make people conform to the rules. If that is not the 
case, the persons involved find it beneficial to agree on sanctions to deter defectors.
1
 Lin 
Ostrom observes that sanctions work best when they are gradual in their severity: a defector 
can first be admonished, then a small punishment can be imposed and only if he or she still 
does not follow the rules a stiff penalty is issued. Such graduated punishment is at odds with 
the idea that even a slight deviation from the rules must be strongly punished as advocated by 
some adherents of the “broken windows theory” (Kelling and Coles 1996; Corman and 
Mocan 2005; Keizer et al. 2008). 
Lin Ostrom’s ideas are so relevant because they are not simply theoretical propositions or the 
result of some laboratory experiment. Rather, they are based on an extensive collection of real 
life cases in many different countries and cultures, and for different types of commons. This 
type of research provides insights based on the empirically observed behavior of individuals 
under conditions they live in. In the more recent parlance, this approach can be called a 
“natural experiment” as the institutions addressing the commons problems are systematically 
compared with each other. This is extremely difficult and burdensome and therefore rarely 
undertaken in modern economics. The reason is not that scholars are lazier today than they 
were 20 or 30 years ago. Rather, the short-term publication pressure has become so intense 
that collecting such an enormous data base for many different countries and over so many 
different types of commons is generally regarded a bad investment for anyone’s present-day 
career purposes.  
 
Despite Lin Ostrom’s pathbreaking contributions (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1993; Ostrom 
et al. 1994) that put institutions evolving from below, and the corresponding incentives 
provided, into the center, economics textbooks and many theoretical treatises still focus on the 
Samuelsonian conception of the necessity that public goods should be supplied by 
government, and private goods by the market. The type of institutional economics advanced 
by Ostrom is still largely disregarded, in particular in neoclassical orthodoxy. Her discussion 
of the particular way in which institutions are shaped to deal with the specific problems of 
various commons is totally different from the attempts of proponents of the “third way” in 
which a vague form of “democratic planning” is advocated. She is far from being an 
ideologue but rather a serious empirically orientated scholar with an open mind interested in 
seeing how the real world functions. 
Not surprisingly, the bestowal of the Nobel Prize came unexpected for many economists, and 
many seem not to have been familiar with her work, or even her name
2
. The committee taking 
the decision can be considered to be more open than many academic economists who tend to 
be committed to standard theory. Unorthodox scholars have been awarded Nobel Prizes in 
Economics before, Kahneman, Sen, Simon, Hayek, Myrdal Fogel and North being examples. 
That Lin Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Prize is all the more noteworthy because economics 
over the recent years has developed in quite a different direction. In line with the explosion of 
experimental work based on game theory, human behavior has increasingly been attributed to 
particular human types such as “defectors”, “collaborators” or “conditional cooperators” – in 
many cases irrespective of institutional conditions. The share of particular types has even 
been determined by percentages. Thus, for example, 50% are said to be “conditionally 
cooperative”, and 30% are said to be “egoists” (Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 2001).
3
 
Identifying individuals as such types seems awkward on the background of Lin Ostrom’s 
work. According to that view such types behave quite differently according to the specific 
institutional conditions they are confronted with. “Conditional” could be understood in the 
sense that behavior depends on the specific institutional condition. In this sense, everyone is a 
“conditional cooperator” (see Torgler and Frey 2007 for the case of tax compliance). 
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Policy Consequences 
Lin Ostrom’s careful identification and analysis of a great number of institutional conditions 
helping to overcome free-riding in public goods and commons is of immediate relevance for 
economic policy. It draws the attention away from the still dominant discussion of 
government versus market. In policy this is reflected in the distinction between government 
intervention and regulation on the one hand, and tradable permits, auction markets and similar 
pricing instruments on the other hand. This antagonism is well visible today for instance in 
the discussion on the global environment (in particular climate change), or on water or noise 
pollution. 
Thinking along the lines suggested by Lin Ostrom’s work focuses attention on the adequate 
choice of institutions to deal with the problems posed by public goods and commons. The 
emphasis is not simply on the instruments such as particular government interventions or 
tradable permits, but rather on the many different ways people involved deal with a particular 
free-riding issue. For adequate institutions to arise, three conditions must be met: 
 
1. It must be known how particular institutions affect the behavior of the individuals 
involved in the supply of a public good or common. While Lin Ostrom has contributed 
foundations, our knowledge of how motivation and behavior depend on institutional 
settings is still seriously limited.  
For future policy it is important to be open with respect to how particular institutions 
affect motivation and therewith behavior. Standard economics takes as granted that 
individuals respond to extrinsic incentives, and disregards the interrelationship with 
intrinsic motivation. Some institutions negatively impact intrinsic motivation, leading 
to a perverse result due to the crowding-out effect. This is likely to happen for instance 
when the tax authority starts from the assumption that every taxpayer deliberately 
cheats on tax returns. The tax authority then treats citizens as subjects and interprets 
every mistake made in a tax declaration to be an attempt to evade taxes. It takes 
aggressive actions against the respective taxpayers (e.g. ordering them to appear in the 
tax office and subjecting them to an audit that reminds of an interrogation in a criminal 
case) instead of discussing the issue informally, e.g. on the phone.
4
 Assuming that 
citizens had some extent of tax morale (which they normally have) they lose it quickly 
when treated in that way (for empirical evidence see Feld and Frey 2002; 2007; 
Torgler 2007; Braithwaite 2009). Lin Ostrom is well aware of such effects going 
against the standard assumptions of neoclassic economics (see, extensively, Ostrom 
2000; Frey 1992; 1997). 
   
2.  New forms of institutions must be considered.  
The institutions with which we are familiar are shaped by history and existing 
technological possibilities. When the need to cope with free-riding problems arises, 
human ingenuity is well equipped to invent new organizational forms and rules. This 
holds in particular with the general availability of means of communication such as 
mobile phones and surveillance cameras, which may possibly reduce the need for 
face-to-face communication and monitoring. At the same time it has become obvious 
that information technology cannot totally substitute for personal interaction
5
. 
In the case of dealing with free-riding issues that arise with public goods and 
commons, the various forms of participation are a crucial issue. There are many 
different forms already existing, and we should be aware of possible new creations. 
Examples are combinations of democratic and random elements (see Elster 1989; 
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Duxbury 1999), or a functional, overlapping and (democratically) competing 
jurisdictions (FOCJ, see Frey and Eichenberger 1999). 
Free-riding problems can also be dealt with by having institutions creating low cost 
situations for opportunities to contribute to public goods and commons, and deterring 
free-riders (see the extensive discussion in Kirchgässner 1992). A case in point is open 
software development such as Wikipedia (see e.g. Osterloh and Rota 2007) which is a 
special case of collective (Allen 1983) or private-collective invention (Von Hippel and 
von Krogh 2003). 
3. The constitutional setting must allow and welcome institutions from below to deal 
with free-riding. 
The trust in human ingenuity to develop institutions able to cope with the problems of 
public goods and commons can materialize only if they are politically feasible. Lin 
Ostrom stressed in her Governing the Commons that good local solutions are often 
undermined by interventions of regional and central authorities. Psychological 
contracts, which are not written law, must allow for adaptation into appropriate 
institutions (for the case of firms see Osterloh and Frey 2000). The constitution must 
therefore contain a provision allowing individuals to find and institute the most 
adequate governance system. This is no matter of course; such provisions are against 
the interests of politicians and bureaucrats and are therefore rarely found in today’s 
constitutions.    
       
 
Conclusion    
Lin Ostrom’s work constitutes a great step forward in the analysis of social 
governance. Instead of focusing on the technical characteristics of goods she studies 
which institutions have emerged to deal with free-riding issues and how they affect 
individual motivation and behavior in public goods and commons situations. Her 
approach is all the more noteworthy as it deviates from the usual tendency, 
particularly in experimental economics based on game theory which tries to identify 
types of persons.   
 
Ostrom’s work is directly relevant to policy. Instead of seeking to overcome free-
riding problems either by government intervening and regulating, or using the market 
by issuing tradable permits or by setting up auctions, her approach suggests a careful 
analysis of institutions often emerging from below. Her program will fruitfully 
contribute to future policy if unorthodox impacts of institutions on individual 
motivation and behavior and the possible creation of new institutions are taken into 
account. Most importantly, the constitutional provisions must enable individuals 
involved in free-riding problems to establish adequate institutions, even against the 
opposition of politicians and bureaucrats.  
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1
 Endogenous sanctioning has been analyzed much later in experimental economics; see Fehr 
and Gächter 2000. 
2
 Consider the following statements posted on the blog “Economics Job Market Rumours”, 
read by economics PhD students, post-docs and young faculty:  “Never heard of Ostrom in 
my life”, “The fact that most of us have not heard about her says enough about her 
contributions”, and  “Economics is superior. Don’t let political science conteminate (sic) us!” 
(compiled by Geoff Hodgson 21 October 2009). It can, of course, be argued that a lot of 
nonsense is written on such blogs. But the same disregard by the economics profession is 
visible in various rankings. Thus, Elinor Ostrom is not among the 5% top of the roughly 
10,000 authors on RePec; on SSRN she is ranked 2,304 with respect to total downloads over 
the last 12 months, and 14,756 with respect to the number of all time downloads.    
3
 But it should be added that good scholars do not make the mistake to overstress the external 
validity of particular games. Nevertheless, the exercise of associating behavior with human 
types focuses on a world in which institutions are not central.  
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4
 Empirical evidence suggests that a considerable number of mistakes are raising, rather than 
reducing, the tax load, i.e. are against the interests of the tax payer. See Feld and Frey 2003.    
5
 Scholars still meet at workshops, managers still attend meetings, and politicians still gather 
at conferences though the costs in terms of time, effort and money are substantial.   
